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Abstract
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator 16.10.1 proposes an important monitoring agenda for the global recording
of a range of violations against journalists as a means to prevent attacks on the communicative functions of journalism.
However, the need for extensive collection of data on violations against journalists raises a number of methodological chal-
lenges. Our research shows the following issuesmust be addressed: the lack of conceptual consistency; the lack ofmethod-
ological transparency; the need for sophisticated data categorisation and disaggregation to enable data to bemerged from
different sources; the need to establish links to understand causal and temporal relations between people and events; and
the need to explore and utilize previously untapped data sources. If we are to strengthen the monitoring of SDG 16.10.1,
we propose to develop a robust and reliable events-based methodology and a set of tools which can facilitate the monitor-
ing of the full range of proposed 16.10.1 categories of violations, reconcile data from multiple sources in order to adhere
to the established 16.10.1 category definitions, and to further disaggregate the proposed 16.10.1 categories to provide
more in-depth information on each instance of a violations. This, we argue, will ultimately contribute towards better un-
derstanding of the contextual circumstances and processes producing aggressions against journalists.
Keywords
events-based methodology; monitoring; safety of journalists; Sustainable Development Goal
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Rethinking Safety of Journalists” edited by Kristin Skare Orgeret (Oslo Metropolitan Univer-
sity, Norway) and William Tayeebwa (University of Makerere, Uganda).
© 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction: The Problem of Adequate Monitoring
The UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and
the Issue of Impunity states that recent years have
shown “disquieting evidence of the scale and number
of attacks against the physical safety of journalists and
media workers as well as of incidents affecting their
ability to exercise freedom of expression” (UN, 2012,
p. 1). Perpetrators of these attacks span both state and
non-state actors, such as formal government represen-
tatives and security forces as well as organized crime
groups, militia, terrorist, and extra-state political groups.
The types of attacks include “killings, death-threats, dis-
appearances, abductions, hostage takings, arbitrary ar-
rests, prosecutions and imprisonments, torture and in-
human and degrading treatment, harassment, intimida-
tion, deportation, and confiscation of and damage to
equipment and property” (Organization for Security and
Co-Operation in Europe, 2012, p. 1). Research shows that
journalists are typically targeted because of their work
in holding power holders to account, for example when
exposing corruption and organized crime and reporting
in conflict zones (Horsley & Harrison, 2013; IFEX, 2015;
UNESCO, 2018a). Attacks are carried out in a variety of so-
cietal contexts that range from conflict and war zones, in-
creasingly fragile states or vulnerable regions, countries
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undergoing political or economic shocks, and in relatively
stable countries (Asal, Krain, Murdie, & Kennedy, 2016;
Bjørnskov & Freytag, 2016; Brambila, 2017; Collinson,
Wilson, & Thomson, 2014; Cottle, Sambrook, & Mosdell,
2016; Gohdes & Carey, 2017; Riddick, Thomson, Wilson,
& Purdie, 2008; Taback & Coupland, 2006; VonDoepp
& Young, 2013; Waisbord, 2002, 2007). Risk and haz-
ard exist in both conflict and non-conflict situations
and, worryingly, threats that intensify risk and hazard
have more recently migrated to on-line (Betz, Lisosky,
& Henrichsen, 2015; Reporters Without Borders [RSF],
2018; UNESCO, 2018b).
Other factors affecting the incidence of attacks are
also being recognised. These include gender (Ferrier,
2018; UNESCO, 2018b), the type of news medium the
journalist works for, the beat covered, or if the journal-
ist is local, foreign, and/or freelance (UNESCO, 2018b).
Problematically, the majority of intimidatory and vio-
lent acts against journalists and freedom of expression
are committed with impunity, meaning that the viola-
tions have no legal consequences and that perpetrators
go unpunished (Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ],
2019a; Horsley, 2011; Parmar, 2014; UNESCO, 2018b).
Considering themulti-layered nature of problems of jour-
nalism safety, any efforts to address safety threats ulti-
mately depend upon our ability to understand and mea-
sure the complexities and dynamics of journalistic risk
and hazard.
The international community has increasingly come
to recognise the safe practice of journalism as a prereq-
uisite for sustainable and human rights-centred develop-
ment. This is acknowledged not least in the SDGs Agenda,
within which the occurrence of violations against the
safety of journalists has been included as an indicator
of Target 16.10, which aims to “ensure public access
to information and protect fundamental freedoms,” by
recording “verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced
disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of jour-
nalists and other harmful acts” (Human Rights Council
[HRC], 2018) through indicator 16.10.1. Indicator 16.10.1
will therefore be used to assess overall progress to the
wider SDG 16, which seeks to “promote peaceful and
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide
access to justice for all and build effective, accountable
and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN, 2019).
While the SDG agenda in this way opens up a path for
the potential universal monitoring of violations against
journalists, the requirements in terms of comprehen-
sive data collection raise a number of methodological
challenges that currently stand in the way of generat-
ing the data needed to achieve the formulated moni-
toring goals. Ultimately, adequate monitoring of occur-
rences of attacks on journalists is essential for under-
standing the complexity, scale, and nature of these prob-
lems and thus “a crucial step toward establishing an em-
pirical evidence base that can serve to tailor interven-
tions aimed at safeguarding journalists and their work”
(Torsner, 2017, p. 129).
In short, these methodological challenges can be de-
scribed as twofold. First, the availability of reliable qual-
ity data on a range of abuses is an issue. Here it is impor-
tant to emphasise that the gathering of data on any type
of abuse against journalists and the verification of its ac-
curacy is a tremendously challenging undertaking that is
being diligently carried out by a range of civil society ac-
tors. This process often involves having to gather data
in the field from volatile and/or conflict-ridden societies
(IFEX, 2011, pp. 20–22), and in contexts where powerful
actors and vested interests are able to conceal or pre-
vent information related to attacks on journalists from
coming to light (RSF, 2019; Sullivan, 2018). Furthermore,
institutionalised local mechanisms that could facilitate
the systematic collection of data on abuses may be un-
der development or completely absent in many contexts.
Importantly, this extends beyond conflict situations to in-
clude developing and developed democracies (Pöyhtäri,
2016, p. 177; UNESCO, 2015). Moreover, data collected
by local civil society organisations are rarely compiled
into a common repository of data that can be used to-
wards the monitoring of indicator 16.10.1 or for struc-
tural cross-country comparison or the domestic analysis
of trends (see Gasteazoro, Gómez, & García, 2019, for an
example of a regional initiative to monitor 16.10.1).
Secondly, the empirical measurability of indicator
16.10.1 is also a pinch point. The UN statistical commis-
sion, which is overseeing the work on operationalising
the indicators, initially argued that the 16.10.1 measure-
ment had some weaknesses and ranked it as a Tier III in-
dicator (theweakest category).While being based on “in-
ternationally agreed standards [that] include UN Human
Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/27/5; UNGA Resolution
A/RES/69/185; UN Security Council Resolution 1738;
UNESCO Executive Board Decision 196 EX/Decision 31;
and the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists
and the Issue of Impunity” (UN, 2016, p. 55), the Tier
III ranking of indicator 16.10.1 meant that no “estab-
lished methodology and standards” existed for the indi-
cator or that “a methodology/standards” were in devel-
opment (UN, 2018, p. 3). Work has since been under-
taken to “refine the methodology and expand the data
collection scope of the indicator” and as a result, indi-
cator 16.10.1 has been upgraded to a Tier II indicator
(UN, 2018, p. 30). It is thus now regarded as “concep-
tually clear [with an] established methodology and stan-
dards available but data are not regularly produced by
countries” (UNESCO, 2018c, p. 2). Consequently, even
if a methodology for measuring and capturing data on
threats and attacks against journalists is developed, the
problem of limitations when it comes to access to re-
liable data still remains. Any attempt to improve mon-
itoring should therefore ideally address the issue of
generating quality data and establishing a methodology
for systematising and comprehensively measuring safety
threats concomitantly.
In practical terms, this article is concerned with
methodological development aimed at contributing to
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the concretemeasurement of the delineated 16.10.1 cat-
egories of violations against journalists. This immediate
utility-oriented goal is, however, interlinked in important
ways with a more overarching research agenda focus-
ing on the task of developing methodologies of mea-
surement to strengthen current data gathering so that
it captures the contextual complexity necessary to un-
derstand problems of safety in a more comprehensive
way. From a sociological perspective, understood to en-
compass the methodical examination of society, social
interaction and patterns (Allan, 2006), generating under-
standing of the phenomenon of safety violations as com-
plex is at the very heart of what the article seeks to con-
tribute towards. Whereas “[f]actual research shows how
things occur…sociology does not just consist of collect-
ing facts” (Giddens, 2009, p. 10), sociology is concerned
with “why things happen” (Giddens, 2009, p. 11) for the
purpose ofmaking sense of factual observations. Lacking
a ground-level understanding of the facts of how viola-
tions against journalists are manifest in the real world
will ultimately prevent any broader analysis into why
the world is so constituted, and consequently how the
causes and wider societal consequences of attacks on
journalists should be assessed. It is thus against the back-
ground of such awider line of inquiry, of tracking not only
the incidence and nature of violations themselves (their
manifestation), but also their causes and consequences
that themethodological groundwork in this article is con-
ducted (Torsner, 2019).
The challenges to achieving this are diverse and sub-
stantial, as addressing them requires that statistics on
violations against journalists are not only systematically
recorded as high-level categories of information—such
as counting the number of killed or imprisoned journal-
ists within a country on a yearly basis. Indeed, such infor-
mation needs to be recorded in a way that can provide a
disaggregated understanding of the context of each viola-
tion. This would also need to allow for the disaggregation
of risk factors through the macro, meso, and micro soci-
ological levels of analysis (Giddens, 2009; Ritzer, 2011)
and therefore understanding an environment hostile to
free and independent journalism as arising from a con-
tinuum of patterns of influence emerging from interac-
tions and “articulations between systems and actors, be-
tween structures and practices” (Ferreira & Serpa, 2017,
p. 3, 2019).
The 16.10.1 indicators ultimately produce categories
of information that allow for the identification of the
number of times journalists have been exposed to a spe-
cific type of violation (killing, arbitrary arrest, and so
on). However, any comprehensive monitoring must be
approached holistically, taking into account the multi-
dimensional nature of safety problems as not only con-
sisting of manifestations but also causes and conse-
quences that go beyond the immediate consequences
suffered by the individual journalist as a result of an
attack. Indeed, such consequences influence the prac-
tice of journalism, for instance by giving rise to prac-
tices of self-censorship (Clark & Grech, 2017; Harrison &
Pukallus, 2018), as well as for society more broadly as
journalistic voices are silenced.
Whereas this would require the systematic study of
risk as producedby social actors including the state, econ-
omy, the law, and the institution of journalism itself, the
aim of this article is narrower in terms of its particular fo-
cus on the improvement of the monitoring of violations
of the safety of the individual journalist. Nevertheless,
the article does so through the lens of sociological holism
with the aim of preparing the ground for establishing a
monitoring methodology that allows for the recording
and subsequent understanding also of the reasons why
violations occur and how the implications of such viola-
tions for society at large should be understood. To this
end the events-based approach developed in this article
meets this requirement of holism by serving as a tool for
amore systematic and disaggregatedmethodological ap-
proach to generate and systematise information on vio-
lations against journalists.
To show how this is achieved, the article will first
diagnose the limitations with extant data that is being
used to track and record violations against journalists for
the purpose of 16.10.1. Second, it examines possibilities
for establishing an events-based methodology for moni-
toring SDG 16.10.1 in a way that generates high-quality
data and allows for the merging of diverse information
through the establishment of an ontological categorisa-
tion scheme.
2. Current Data Limitations Preventing Comprehensive
SDG 16.10.1 Monitoring
To understand the empirical and methodological limita-
tions of existing data we examined a selection of data
sets that provide examples of international, regional and
national level monitoring of violations against journal-
ists (see Appendix 1 in the Supplementary File). We then
studied the extent to which the categories of informa-
tion recorded by monitoring organisations cover the five
main SDG 16.10.1 violations categories (killings, kidnap-
ping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and
torture) as well as the sixth category of ‘other harmful
acts’ (added to the categories of violations through the
adoption of theHumanRights Council Resolution in 2018;
HRC, 2018). Our findings show that there are three key
areas that must be addressed to achieve effective moni-
toring of SDG 16.10.1 and to better understand the con-
textual circumstances producing attacks against journal-
ists. These include: a) the issue of data coverage; b) the
issue of data reconciliation and disparate definitions; and
c) problems of data categorisation and systematisation.
a) The issue of data coverage
Our research shows that the violations category of
killings is recorded in all data sets covered. Although illus-
trated here through a representative sample, the conclu-
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sion that killings are the violation most commonly mon-
itored is consistent with findings presented elsewhere
(see e.g., Torsner, 2017, 2019). Whereas the monitor-
ing of lethal attacks against journalists is absolutely es-
sential since it captures the most serious form of viola-
tion of journalistic expression, the argument here is that
it is necessary to widen current monitoring to include
the full range of physical and non-physical attacks per-
petrated against journalists. This ultimately points to the
need to respond to wider lines of inquiry such as un-
covering how different societal contexts produce certain
types of violations against journalists; sub-national and
regional variations in violations; the types of violations
facing different categories of journalists; and the range
of responses to attacks (e.g., from families, peers, news
organisations, civil society, and states). While these in-
vestigations lie beyond the scope of this article, it is nev-
ertheless the aim here to build the foundations for these
explorations by establishing a methodological infrastruc-
ture that enables such analyses to be conducted from
the data. Indeed, any such wider analytical assessment
on the nature and scope of challenges to the safety of
journalists using only data on lethal violations “as a sin-
gle indicator of risk” (Torsner, 2019, p. 128) may lead to
incorrect conclusions with regards to trends and their
real manifestation (see e.g., Landman & Carvalho, 2010,
p. 50). If we look beyond the category of killings to the
other SDG 16.10.1 categories, we see that there are sub-
stantial differences in the coverage of incident types,
with certain categories of violations being recorded by
some organisations but not by others. Importantly, this
points to the disparate nature of categories that are used
to record violations. The fact that data sets covering a
specific national context (such as La Fundación para la
Libertad de Prensa) tend to record a wider range of cate-
gories than those covering international statistics (repre-
sented here by the CPJ) indicates the need also to facili-
tate the incorporation of data collected in a local context
when monitoring SDG 16.10.1.
In addition to limitations related to data range and
coverage, conceptual inconsistencies between different
data sets are also preventing comprehensive monitoring
of 16.10.1. Examining the data on lethal violations re-
veals that a number of definitional, methodological, and
verification-related considerations lead various monitor-
ing organisations to differing approaches when it comes
to how, when andwhy they record a killing in their tallies,
for example who is considered a journalist (only profes-
sional journalists, or also citizen journalists and bloggers).
These considerations cause yearly statistics on killings
within a country to differ between organisations (see
e.g., IFEX, 2011; Sarikakis et al., 2017; Torsner, 2017).
b) The issue of data reconciliation and disparate
definitions
Our findings also show that there is a lack of concep-
tual consistency across data sets, with numerous defi-
nitions being used to describe the same type of viola-
tion. Given that the rationale for the guidelines on the
metadata for indicator 16.10.1 provided by the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
is based on human rights provisions (such as the right to
life and liberty), making extant data compatible with defi-
nitions adopted for monitoring 16.10.1 is key, and under-
lines the problem of conceptual inconsistency with ex-
tant datawhich also does not expressly adopt the 16.10.1
definitions. These definitional challenges become par-
ticularly clear when considering the category of ‘other
harmful acts’ (HRC, 2018) where the disparate nature of
definitions used makes any attempt to harmonize differ-
ent data sets in a way that adheres to the 16.10.1 cate-
gorisation far from straightforward.
c) Problems of data categorisation and systematisation
Whereas generating more data on a wide range of differ-
ent types of violations is key to strengthening the moni-
toring of 16.10.1, we also argue that improving monitor-
ing is not simply a matter of gathering more data of the
kind that already exists. Rather, methodological develop-
ment is also needed with regards to data categorisation
and systematisation. This can be illustrated through the
statistics on instances of lethal violations which are com-
monly recorded as counts of the number of yearly oc-
currences of killings within a country. These figures are
accompanied by varying levels of detail about the inci-
dent and its surrounding circumstances. In some cases,
only the bare minimum facts (that a killing has occurred)
are recorded, at least in structured form, while in oth-
ers, a wider picture is put together. In most cases, a large
amount of additional information is left as unstructured
qualitative free text, which currently serves no purpose
in terms of classification and wider monitoring efforts,
but could be extremely useful to more systematically un-
derstand the bigger picture and to identify causal, tem-
poral, and other relations between events, such as inves-
tigating the escalation of threats into full-scale killings.
From the perspective of trying to contextualise and
understand why and how journalist murders occur, the
recording of detailed information that goes beyond
statistics that count the number of killings is thus par-
ticularly important. The CPJ records categories of infor-
mation related to a killing, such as the type of perpetra-
tor involved (e.g., military, political, or government ac-
tors), the types of topics covered by the journalist (e.g.,
corruption, human rights, or war), as well as whether
they received threats prior to being murdered. CPJ also
records the status of the judicial investigation into a
killing through the categories of ‘complete impunity,’
‘partial justice,’ and ‘full justice’ (CPJ, 2019b). While such
further disaggregation of information related to a killing
is very valuable, we argue that there is a need to system-
atically record additional sub-categories of information
providing more in-depth information on each instance
of a violation, which could for instance be used to map
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 89–100 92
how acts of intimidation against a journalist might esca-
late into lethal violence.
In the following section, we develop a proposal for
addressing these outlined data limitations by using an
events-based methodology rather than the traditional
person-centric approach, and demonstrate how such a
methodology can effectively improve existing monitor-
ing of violations against journalists.
3. An Events-Based Methodology for the Improved
Monitoring of 16.10.1
Within social science analysis, events are commonly stud-
ied social phenomena ranging from macro social events
(e.g., regime changes and civil unrest) to micro events
affecting an individual (Landman & Carvalho, 2010). For
the purpose of this article, an event is essentially un-
derstood as a violation of the rights of a journalist. By
responding to the questions of what happened, when,
andwhowas involved, an events-basedmeasure can pro-
vide descriptive or numerical summaries of human rights
events (Bollen, 1992, p. 37). Accordingly, the data can
be disaggregated at the level of the violation, as well
as at the level of the person (the individual journalist),
which allows for the contextualisation and recording of
related information in an in-depth manner. This may in-
clude: information about key actors involved in a viola-
tion and their interrelationships (victim, perpetrator, and
witnesses); the time and place of the violation; and the
systematic recording of multiple violations experienced
by the same victim (e.g., detention, torture, and killing),
or a single violation experienced bymultiple victims (e.g.,
a bombing). This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows
an excerpt from a BBC (2018) report on the murder of
Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia.
Applying the event-based approach, all the facets of
this narrative statement can be represented, allowing
for both the notion of a hierarchy of events (i.e., an
event can contain sub-events) and the notion of chains
of events (which can be causal and/or temporal). This
can be achieved by categorising each incident (an over-
all scenario which involves one or more journalists) as
an event which may contain further sub-events (e.g., tor-
ture during imprisonment) and which may have links to
other sub-events (such as death resulting from the tor-
ture). In this way, multiple violations of a single person
can be represented in a connected way, as well as the
same event happening to multiple people. For example,
the Caruana Galizia case could be represented as shown
in Figure 2.
Having illustrated howan events-based approach can
facilitate the uncovering of deeper explanation and un-
derstanding of what happened and why it happened in
a particular context, the article will now investigate how
The family of murdered Maltese an-corrupon journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia is demanding an
independent public inquiry because she had suﬀered years of inmidaon.
She was killed by a car bomb near her home in October. Her widely-read blog accused top policians
of corrupon.
One of her sons, Paul, said three pet dogs were killed and aempts were made to burn down the
journalist’s home.
Figure 1. Excerpt from BBC report of the death of Daphne Caruana Galizia. Source: BBC (2018).
•   Dogs killed
•   Aempt to burn
     down house
•   Legal acon
Events prior
to murder
INTIMIDATION JUDICIAL FOLLOW-UP
REACTIONS
CONSEQUENCES
Events connected
with murder
Events following
murder
•   Details of murder
•   Locaon
•   Time
•   Judicial processes
•   Status of impunity
•   Connuing lawsuits
     targeng murdered
     journalists
MURDER
Figure 2. Event-based representation of the case of Daphne Caruana Galizia, with an ‘intimidation’ event containing sepa-
rate sub-events of ‘dog killing’ and ‘home burning attempts,’ followed chronologically (though not necessarily causally) by
the ‘murder’ event (the car bomb), and subsequently by various judicial follow-up events. Note: Each of these events has
a number of features attached to it (not depicted), such as the name of the victim, a date, and time.
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the events-based approach combined with an ontologi-
cal classification scheme can address several problem ar-
eas identified in the initial data review.
3.1. How Can Developing an Events-Based Methodology
Improve the Monitoring of Violations against
Journalists?
As illustrated, the events-based approach provides a way
to deal with the complex nature of a human rights viola-
tion and its recording, by putting the violation itself at the
centre and allowing for its in-depth description. What
might be considered a single violation (such as a killing)
might upon closer examination be interrelated with sev-
eral other events (such as various forms of intimidation
in the case of Daphne Caruana Galizia). This is important
in order to understand the progression of events: It is crit-
ical to know whether killings typically appear in isolation
or as the final act in a series of violations gradually in-
creasing in severity, and similarly to understand whether
threats or more minor incidents gradually escalate into
more serious ones. To deal with these types of relations
between event types and for their categorisation, we use
a shallow ontology as a form of hierarchical classification
system. Gruber (1993, p. 199) originally defined an ontol-
ogy as “an explicit specification of a conceptualization.”
In simple terms, an ontology can be considered as es-
sentially a hierarchical structure with general categories
at the top level, branching out in more specific subcate-
gories at lower levels, as shown in Figure 3, where ‘shoot-
ing’ is a more specific subcategory of ‘physical attack,’
which is itself a subcategory of ‘abuse.’
There are several important things to note about the
use of an ontology as a classification system. First, an
ontology is typically a directed acyclic graph, not a tree,
which means among other things that categories can be
represented in multiple places simultaneously (multiple
inheritance). For example, ‘bombing’ could be a subcat-
egory of both ‘murder’ and ‘collateral target.’ Second, it
enables information to be represented at varying levels
of granularity. Some databases record quite broad cat-
egories (e.g., Mapping Media Freedom does not distin-
guish between arrest and imprisonment) while other in-
formation sources have more specific categories, mak-
ing a clear distinction between those two things. This
has the advantage that information can easily be ag-
gregated in different ways, depending on the level of
specificity required (e.g., one can look at all abuse as
a single unit, or one can look specifically at all psycho-
logical abuse as a subset of this). In its simpler forms,
ontological classification is compatible with a spread-
sheet structure and can be used to create aggregated
datasets that can then be semantically searched via po-
tentially complex queries (see e.g., Maynard, Funk, &
Lepori, 2017; Maynard, Roberts, Greenwood, Rout, &
Bontcheva, 2017).
3.2. The Use of a Classification Hub as a Means to
Merge Disparate Data Sources
To help mitigate these issues, we propose the adop-
tion of an ontology as a central hub which enables the
mapping of different categorisation schemes. We should
note, however, that there is no real concept of a sin-
gle correct ontology—as with the existing categorisation
schemes used by the monitoring organisations, an on-
tology offers a subjective viewpoint. A good ontology is
therefore one which adequately meets the needs of the
situation and data. On the other hand, an ontology of-
fers a flexible approach which solves the problem of non-
commensurability by enabling mapping to existing cate-
gorisation and classification schemes.
As we see from the Appendix 1 in the Supplementary
File, different monitoring efforts may use different terms
and classification systems. For example, one monitoring
effort may consider online hate speech to be a particu-
lar kind of psychological threat, along with other verbal
abuse, while another may consider it a particular kind of
online threat along with doxxing, online censoring, etc.
Similarly, one may use the term ‘assassination’ while an-
other may use the term ‘murder’—these may or may
not represent the same set of events. Ideally, a standard-
ised set of terms and schemes should be used by every-
one, but a prescriptive strategy that dictates preferen-
tial terminology and classifications is simply impossible
to enforce, and is highly problematic. Thus, we suggest
a more flexible solution that allows monitoring organi-
sations and researchers to enhance the existing data by
mapping to an ontology-based solution.
As we have already mentioned, existing categori-
sation schemes for both killings and other acts of vi-
olence against journalists are insufficient for our pur-
pose, because they are not comprehensive and because
they differ widely, resulting in incommensurable data.
Abuse
Harassment Physical Aack
Torture Sexual assault Shoong
Surveillance Psychological Abuse
Figure 3. Simple partial ontology showing the relationship between (a selected set of) different kinds of abuse.
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Bearing in mind that we do not wish to impose a new
subjective classification scheme, we turn instead to ex-
isting well-defined schemes from the fields of human
rights and crime—namely HURIDOCS (Dueck, Guzman,
& Verstappen, 2001) from the former (see Table 1)
and International Crime Classification Scheme (ICCS;
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015) from the latter
(see Table 2).
UNESCO has already started to investigate the ICCS
in this respect (see guidelines on the metadata for indi-
cator 16.10.1 provided by the OHCHR, 2018). We there-
fore propose there should be mapping to both schemes
via an intermediary set of terms/classes, as shown in the
Supplementary File. For example, currently there are no
specific classes in either scheme for many of the kinds
of violations we want to monitor, e.g., cyberbullying has
only the general class (threat, harassment, psychological
assault); exile has a specific class in HURIDOCS but not
in ICCS (where it just falls under ‘other deprivation of lib-
erty’) because it is not specifically a crime. The linking
of existing classification systems to definitions of human
rights violations such as HURIDOCS also helps to estab-
lish a link to the 16.10.1 category definitions. Crucially,
such a link is currently lacking in current monitoring. Our
approach therefore has the potential to embed 16.10.1
monitoring into the sustainable ongoing and institutional
practice of official agencies such as HURIDOCS, assuming
that it is possible to disaggregate victims in terms of their
link to journalism.
A further benefit of adopting a semantic form of
categorisation using an ontology-based classification sys-
tem is that it enables representation at different lev-
els of granularity and easy exchange between different
datasets. As we have seen from the table in Appendix 1
in the Supplementary File, some schemes do not make
subtle distinctions. Where this information is available
(either through the existing scheme or through analysis
of additional data on the event), our approach will en-
able us to make fine-grained distinctions; where it is not,
we can simply assimilate data at a lesser granularity.
In Figure 4, we show a possible conceptual structure
for mapping between existing categorisations, text, and
databases. On the left we see information from a CPJ
database. Blue boxes denote (existing) categories in the
various schemes, with blue arrows connecting categories
together, while red boxes denote instances of records.
Thus, in the CPJ database we see an instance (Record 01)
which is some text about the journalist AbayHailu. In that
database, the event has been categorised as ‘Dangerous
Assignment.’ The horizontal blue arrow maps this cate-
Table 1. Excerpt from HURIDOCS classification scheme for killings, showing code, and description.
01 Violations of the right to life
0101 Direct actions which violate the right to life
010101 Deliberate killings of specific individuals
01010101 Summary execution
01010102 Extra-judicial execution outside any legal proceedings
01010103 Legal execution (capital punishment)
01010104 Politically-motivated killing by non-state agent(s)
01010105 Murder (deliberate killing which ought to be seen as a common criminal act)
Table 2. ICCS categorisation of acts of killing.
Section 01 Acts leading to death or intending to cause death
Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Crime
0101 Intentional homicide
0102 Attempted intentional homicide
0103 Non-intentional homicide
010301 Non-negligent manslaughter
010302 Negligent manslaughter
010321 Vehicular homicide
010322 Non-vehicular homicide
0104 Assisting or instigating suicide
010401 Assisting suicide
010409 Other acts of assisting or instigating suicide
0105 Euthanasia
0106 Illegal feticide
0107 Unlawful killing associated with armed conflict
0108 Other acts leading to death or intending to cause death
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Dangerous
Assignment
0101 Direct
acons which
violate the right
to life
010106 Death in
certain locaons
010103 Killings
in the context of
conﬂict
0107 Unlawful
killing associated
with armed conﬂict
01 Acts leading to
death or intending
to cause death
01010601 Death
in detenon or
police custody
Abay Hailu
Was refused
medical
treatment in
prison and
died as a
result
Record 01
CPJ database
ICCS scheme
HURIDOCS scheme
Figure 4. A conceptual structure for mapping events.
gory from the CPJ database to the HURIDOCS category
0101 (direct actions which violate the right to life) in the
centre of the picture. This might seem an odd mapping,
but HURIDOCS has no category that really fits ‘Dangerous
Assignment’ specifically, sowemap it at the highest level,
which equates just to ‘killing.’ The HURIDOCS scheme
depicts a couple of sub-classes of Category 01, such
as Category 01010601. This can be linked with the tex-
tual description of Abay Hailu’s death from CPJ—either
manually or by automated Natural Language Processing
tools—because both describe death in prison. On the
right-hand side of the picture, we also show how one
might link other schemes such as ICCS to the hub. Rather
than linking directly from the CPJ record to ICCS, we sim-
ply link ICCS categories to HURIDOCS categories where
possible, so that by extension, we can deduce the link
from an instance of an event to the ICCS (and other clas-
sification schemes). This minimises the amount of work
needed each time a new event is added. So we can map
ICCS Category 01 ‘Acts leading to death or intending to
cause death’ directly to HURIDOCS Category 0101, and
we can link ICCS Category 0107 ‘Unlawful killing associ-
ated with armed conflict’ directly to HURIDOCS Category
010103 ‘Killings in the context of conflict.’
It is important to note that the scheme also enables
the mapping of multiple sources of information together.
Figure 4 shows the addition of the information from the
free text description about Hailu’s death, but we can add
as many other sources as we want, such as additional
news reports, information recorded in other databases,
or even from social media. Discussion of this is beyond
the scope of this report, but methods for information ex-
traction and information mapping can be used to pull to-
gether the information into a single coherent represen-
tation. Finally, we touch briefly on the inter-related issue
of information verification.
3.3. Verification of Information
Indicator 16.10.1 also specifies that cases must be ver-
ified. This means that reported cases should contain a
minimum set of relevant information on particular peo-
ple and incidents, which have been reviewed by man-
dated bodies, mechanisms, and institutions, who in turn
have found reasonable grounds to believe that a viola-
tion took place. One of the most critical problems in the
monitoring of data on killings—and other forms of vio-
lence against journalists—is connected with the validity
and reliability of this data. Many factors can affect the
counts of violations and thus confuse the data, such as
the differences in what to count. For example, the CPJ
only considers cases where a direct link to journalism is
proven, while others, such as RSF, count also prima facie
links and unproven cases.
The reporting of killings and other events may be in-
accurate due to deliberate disinformation, such as ad-
justing the numbers of harmed journalists, not reporting
that a journalist was harmed, or falsely reporting that a
journalist was not harmed. It may also simply be misin-
formation due to rumour, uncertainty or confusion (such
as using different names for the same person), or due
to differences in definitions and data collection method-
ologies (see for instance IFEX, 2011). Enormous research
effort has recently been put into developing methods
to recognise and categorise various forms of false infor-
mation in news reports and social media (del Vicario
et al., 2016; Kim, Tabibian, Oh, Schölkopf, & Gomez-
Rodriguez, 2018; Tucker et al., 2018), and there are a
number of research projects addressing this issue, such
asWeVerify. Investigations into fake news and false infor-
mation have also been undertaken by both the UK gov-
ernment (House of Commons, 2018) and the European
Parliament (2019).
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In this research, we focus on methods to deal with
inaccurate or incorrect information. We propose to ad-
dress the notion of information verification in our mon-
itoring approach by developing a range of mechanisms
for automatically assessing the likelihood of correctness.
For this we can consider features such as the number of
sources reporting the event, the nature of these sources
(some sources are known to be more reliable than oth-
ers), the similarity between the reports, and the nature
of this similarity. We propose to address the notion of
information verification in our monitoring approach by
developing a range of mechanisms for automatically as-
sessing the likelihood of correctness. For this we can con-
sider features such as the number of sources reporting
the event, the nature of these sources (some sources are
known to bemore reliable than others), the similarity be-
tween the reports, and the nature of this similarity. We
recommend including measures of: number of sources;
type of sources (news, social media, eyewitness reports,
etc.); reliability of the sources (a number of initiatives are
focusing on this, such as the Global Disinformation Index,
2019; the Journalism Trust Initiative, 2018; and Media
Bias Fact Check, 2019); and content reliability (for in-
stance, a number of tools are being developed currently
for verification of news, debunking, and fact-checking).
Finally, when the information in two or more sources
conflicts, their reliability is inherently questionable, and
this can be an additional factor to consider. In order
to determine whether two records of an event can be
matched or merged, we can consider each feature’s im-
portance (see Postma, Ilievski, & Vossen, 2018).
4. Conclusions
In response to the current limitationswith data that is be-
ing gathered on violations against journalists on the na-
tional, regional, and international levels, and the range
of challenges in monitoring the 16.10.1 indicators, this
article has suggested that an events-based methodol-
ogy adopting an ontological classification scheme pro-
vides a new means to map disparate data sources re-
lating to attacks on journalists. Such an approach repre-
sents a way forward in improving our understanding of
the manifestations of violations against journalists as it
captures the real world complexity of these violations,
while simultaneously making it possible to adhere to ex-
isting norms and schemes without trying to impose un-
wanted restraints on those who collect information in
the field (often under adverse conditions) and organi-
sations who maintain records of violations for monitor-
ing purposes. We therefore propose to realise this event-
based approach bymeans of methods and tools that aim
to strengthen ongoing monitoring efforts by facilitating
processes to generate, categorise, and systematise data
on a wide range of violation types. This article provides a
starting point and roadmap for envisioning and designing
prototype tools and associated methodologies that we
ultimately hope will contribute towards building a com-
prehensive evidence base to understand how and why
violations occur in more depth, while also contributing
towards addressing and redressing problems of safety in
a more efficient way. Through this approach, there is no
requirement for any currentmonitoring efforts tomodify
their practices, but rather, we propose there could be en-
hancement of their data through the use of text analytics
and more complex classification and mapping schemes.
This data enhancement applies equally to individual lo-
cal monitoring efforts and to global, more encompass-
ing schemes.
Nevertheless, there are a number of challenges and
assumptions to be considered. First, an events-based
methodology is a relatively fundamental change in think-
ing, which may not appeal to all. Second, local monitor-
ing organisations must be open to ideas about collabo-
rative working practices to improve monitoring efforts,
whichmay involve sharing of data. Third, even if tools are
provided, there is no guarantee that they will be used by
relevant stakeholders. While the approach that we pro-
pose is only meant to serve to enhance existing informa-
tion, it does require additional effort to use and under-
stand. Related to this, it is important to understand that
the use of automated tools is not without risk, particu-
larly if not taken in its proper context. Natural language
processing is certainly not infallible, and mistakes will be
made by automated tools. Thus, there is an important
element of caveat emptor. The same applies to verifica-
tion tools, which again should only be used as a guide
and not a solution; for example, a risk of inadvertent
exclusion and inclusion applies if tools/accreditation are
implemented and become de facto statements of trust
across diverse information sources.
Moving forward, we see two key avenues to pur-
sue. First, improved monitoring is required: Based on
the needs and priorities of the community of monitor-
ing organisations and/or individual or groups of moni-
toring civil society organisations, tools should be devel-
oped to address issues of data generation, categorisation
and systematising, both for the systematic monitoring of
16.10.1, and for strengthening the monitoring capacity
of local civil society organisations. Second, improved re-
search and analysis of violations against journalists is re-
quired, addressing the need for data tools that can facili-
tate the comprehensive analysis of shifting safety trends
for the purpose of better understanding the nature and
dynamics of safety threats.
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